Police in the UK are thinking about installing new CCTV cameras sensitive enough to record conversations up to 100 m away
cctv adds audio. file under transparent society. via rekha
Sapere Aude
Tag: transparent_society
Police in the UK are thinking about installing new CCTV cameras sensitive enough to record conversations up to 100 m away
cctv adds audio. file under transparent society. via rekha
a new take on the transparent society: solving the problem of externalities with the byproducts of information-enabling everything: supply chains, health care, sensor networks, etc
new tools for the transparent society
i toss around this term all the time, better bookmark it. the perfect prison architecture
The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a mobile phone’s microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby conversations. The technique is called a “roving bug,” and was approved by top US Department of Justice officials for use against members of a New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping him.
hello, transparent society.
this is an innovative use of mapping and gps (not to mention of behavioral incentives)
the first index to rate countries on how open their budget books are to their citizens.
this argues strongly in favor of keeping archives of successive generations of Google’s base layer. Added bonus: placemarks of time-sensitive artifacts like planes in flight could be metatagged to a specific generation of imagery.
As part of a general amnesty, houses built before 2001 on plots of illegally sold land were “regularised”, and thus allowed to be resold on the market. Somebody with government connections got the bright idea of “backdating” some houses built after 2004, pretending that they were there since 2000, so that they could benefit from the amnesty and sell them. Digital Globe imagery from 2004 in Google Earth quickly put paid to that lie.
an introduction by steve mann
Here are 10 Hypotheses.
(techlaw). Sousveillance will become a major force and industry, despite initial opposition. Like surveillance, sousveillance technology will outstrip many laws, and will be another example of technology moving forward more quickly than the legal framework that grows around it.
(privacy). Over the past 30 years, sousveillance practice has raised many new privacy, legal, and ethical issues, and these issues will become central as the sousveillance industry grows.
(incidentalism). Sousveillance of the most pure form, is not merely the carrying around of a hand-held camera, but, rather, must include elements of incidentalist imaging to succeed. For this reason, camera phones, pocket organizers containing cameras in them, and wristwatch cameras, for example, exhibit an incidentalist imaging effect not experienced with even the very smallest of handheld digital cameras. A device exhibits incidentalist imaging when it can capture images as well as perform at least one other important and socially justifiable function that does not involve capturing images. This “backgrounding” by another socially justifiable function is a technology that is essential for sousveillance to take root in most societies.
(accidentalism). Cameraphones, cameraPDAs, and wristcameras have brought sousveillance to a new level. The next major level is that which affords the user deniability for the intentionality of image capture. This feature may be implemented by a random or automated image capture, or by allowing others to remotely initiate image capture. In this way image capture becomes accidental, and this accidentalism affords the user with a strategic ambiguity when asked such questions as “are you taking pictures of me now”?
(nonwillfulness). Accidentalism will be taken to a new level when it can be a requirement of a role player, such as a clerk. Just as surveillance is hierarchical, thus creating an industry that can defend itself from criticism (e.g. “don’t ask me why there’s a surveillance camera in my store, I only work here”), sousveillance will also rise to this same level of deniability. Accidentalism by itself might be regarded as willful blindness. But when combined with, for example, a requirement to participate in sousveillance (e.g. sousveillance technology might, for example, become part of a clerk’s uniform) accidentalism becomes nonwillful blindness.
(nonwillful blindness). Various forms of continuous incidentalist imaging will give rise to an industry behind products and services for continuous sousveillance. Continuous sousveillance will make sousveillance the norm, rather than the exception, for at least some individuals in society.
(protection). Unlike surveillance, sousveillance will require a strong legal framework for its protection, and not just its limitation. Along these lines, certain legal protections will be required to ensure access to those who depend on sousveillance.
(disabled). These legal protections will first emerge in the form of assistance to the disabled.
(differently abled). The space of those considered to be disabled will gradually expand, over time, as the technological threshold falls and the sousveillance industry grows.
(other benefits). These legal protections will expand, to encompass other legitimate and reasonable uses of sousveillance, such as artistic and technosocial inquiry, photojournalism, and collection of evidence.
brin’s opening statement: both sides want same goals:
suspicion of authority
preservation of human diversity
core question: how do we maintain a decent human society? the 4 problem solvers of our civilization: markets, courts, science
brin believes that privacy will be closer to home. the future will be like the village of old, the privacy will be in the home sphere “the european privacy activists want to generate oceans of privacy legislation. this is a lousy basis to base your freedom on.” the core issue is accountability. asked about faking names for subway cards: “i game the system too. do what it takes to prevail in the age of ashcroft”.
templeton opening statement:
you don’t care about your privacy until after it has been invaded. You must protect other’s privacy to protect your own. Transparency has virtues: accountability, open flows of information. BUT: Transparency will be subverted. The aristocrats are too strong. For valid reasons of national security, global competition. For fake reasons: national security and global competition. What if encryption gets taxed or outlawed? Enforced transparency has not worked: campaign reform anyone? Where is the fully transparent company? Is criticism the only antidote to error? Never mind Bob Woodward’s book, Bush still got reelected. The truth can be buried in the noise. Also, surveillance has never worked completely: Even in China or prison camps. The oppressed always win, at least in the small. But surveillance is always abused.
Brin counteracts: In the transparent society, there is an example of a company with completely open books, visible to all employees. The company is very successful. Another example: There was a release of a toxicological substances. Within a year, the top polluters worked to get their name out of that list. The need for the wallet is gone if you can get anyone and assess their reputation, just like the village of old, with a handshake, only that this time, your eyeglasses scan the credit history of your counterpart. Also, it is easier, epistemologically, to verify what you know than to verify that someone does not know. “i am an equal opportunity offender.”
for a much more eloquent writeup head over to worldchanging.