Self-locating uncertainty is a different kind of epistemic uncertainty from that featured in pilot-wave models. You can know everything there is to know about the universe, and there’s still something you’re uncertain about, namely where you personally are within it. Your uncertainty obeys the rules of ordinary probability, but it requires a bit of work to convince yourself that there’s a reasonable way to assign numbers to your belief. In one sense, all of these notions of probability can be thought of as versions of self-locating uncertainty. All we have to do is consider the set of all possible worlds — all the different versions of reality one could possibly conceive. Some such worlds obey the rules of dynamical-collapse theories, and each of these is distinguished by the actual sequence of outcomes for all the quantum measurements ever performed. Other worlds are described by pilot-wave theories, and in each one the hidden variables have different values. Still others are many-worlds realities, where agents are uncertain about which branch of the wave function they are on. We might think of the role of probability as expressing our personal credences about which of these possible worlds is the actual one.